![splunk tstats splunk tstats](https://www.octamis.com/octamis-blog/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Screenshot-from-2020-04-02-12-36-21-1536x255.png)
![splunk tstats splunk tstats](https://www.unsafehex.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/4-tstats-search-1-1536x588.png)
We have collected information about the observed vectors in relation to HermeticWiper according to several security vendors including Symantec, ESET, Sentinel One. STRT has also released a new analytic story covering HermeticWiper itself. This payload is another destructive tool in the ongoing campaign which has included DDoS attacks, web defacements, MDM attacks, Microsoft SQL attacks and now two known as of yet destructive payloads. Reported to have been deployed via Group Policy Object (Windows Active Directory Group Policy Object) Modifies "GlobalFolderOptions" registry at file permission level (NTFS)Ĭhecks for FAT (Windows XP) and NTFS (Windows OS newer than XP using NTFS)Ĭorrupts (Destroys) MBR and NTFS file system Interacts with the system via signed driverĭisables crash dump functionality (Anti-Forensic) In addition to other commonly known wiper destructive features, HermeticWiper also presents the following unique behaviors: HermeticWiper introduces some unique features, applying destructive actions on compromised hosts. Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.As stated in our previous threat advisory STRT-TA02 in regards to destructive software, past historical data suggests that for malicious actors to succeed in long-standing campaigns they must improve and add new ways of making their payloads stealthier, resistant, and damaging. Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author. The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Registry modification in "shutdownwithoutlogon" on $dest$ In that scenario filter of machine and users that can modify this registry is needed.
#Splunk tstats windows#
This windows feature may implement by administrator in some server where shutdown is critical. To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Processes and Registry node. List of fields required to use this analytic. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL. Windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter is a empty macro by default. | `windows_disable_shutdown_button_through_registry_filter` | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process st Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where (Registry.registry_path= "*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System\\shutdownwithoutlogon" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000") OR (Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\Explorer\\NoClose" Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000001") by _time span=1h st er Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
![splunk tstats splunk tstats](https://ashishrocks.files.wordpress.com/2021/01/image-5.png)
This analytic is to detect a suspicious registry modification to disable shutdown button on the logon user. Windows Disable Shutdown Button Through Registry